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ABSTRACT 
Companies in the water and sanitation sector try to balance the social responsibility of an 
essential asset and the remuneration of investors within a heterogeneous market for 
financial assets. The objective of this study is to evaluate the dividend policy of publicly 
traded companies in the water and sanitation sector in relation to the price of their market 
value. The period of study ranged from the IPO of the shares until December 31, 2019. 
The following variables were collected from each company: price, payment of dividends 
(aggregated in annual payment), annual net income and payout, this one defined as the 
ratio between the dividend payment and net income. The following conclusions were 
reached: 1) no differences were found between dividend paying and non-paying 
companies regarding the value of their shares; 2) there were also no differences between 
high and low payout paying companies regarding the value of their shares. 
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RESUMO 
Empresas do setor de água e saneamento tentam equilibrar a responsabilidade social de 
um bem essencial e a remuneração de investidores dentro de um mercado heterogêneo 
de ativos financeiros. O objetivo deste estudo é avaliar a política de dividendos de 
empresas de capital aberto do setor de água e saneamento em relação ao preço de seu 
valor de mercado. O período de abrangência compreendeu desde o IPO das ações até 
31 de dezembro de 2019. De cada empresa foram coletadas as seguintes variáveis: 
cotação, pagamento de dividendos (agregado em pagamento anual), lucro líquido anual 
e payout, este último definido como a razão entre o pagamento de dividendos e o lucro 
líquido. Chegou-se às seguintes conclusões: 1) não foram encontradas diferenças entre 
empresas pagadoras e não pagadoras de dividendos quanto ao valor de suas ações; 2) 
também não foram encontradas diferenças entre empresas pagadoras de alto e baixo 
payout quanto ao valor de suas ações. 
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Despite investments made since the 50's of the last century, Brazil still remains 
with great inequalities in the water and sanitation sector (LEONETI et al., 2011). In 
addition, according to Leoneti et al. (2011), the main deficit is in the collection and 
treatment of sewage, higher than access to drinking water. In recent years, however, 
mainly through private initiative, resources have been invested. The authors warn of the 
need for these investments to be sustainable. Furthermore, according to Scriptore and 
Toneto-Júnior (2012), investment in sanitation is strategic for the country's long-term 
development, since this sector, in addition to guaranteeing the human right to drinking 
water, generates a series of positive externalities for public health, the environment, 
quality of life and income generation. 
According to Freitas et al. (2014), universal access to the water and sewage 
network can generate positive externalities in Brazil, ranging from a decrease in health 
care expenses, thanks to a decrease in hospital admissions, generating savings of R$ 
27.3 million annually, as well as a reduction in in mortality from gastrointestinal infectious 
diseases and amount of time away from work. In turn, within a strictly economic 
perspective, the authors estimate a gain in wages, resulting in an increase in payroll of 
R$ 105.5 billion annually, and this gain, in the long run, could reach 31, 6 billion annually, 
due to productivity gains. Universal access to water and sewage would also contribute to 
reducing the backwardness of education, real estate valuation (up to R$ 178 billion) and 
the greater number of workers in the tourism sector. 
Nunes (2015), demonstrated that public entities in the sanitation sector are still very 
incipient and state and municipal regulatory bodies are weak compared to large sanitation 
companies. Today there is a lack of a national regulatory body. The low regulation of 
public power, coupled with the omission of the state, hinders the development of the 
sector. In addition, Sousa and Costa (2013) highlight that the decision-making arena 
divided between the interests of states and municipalities makes it difficult to reach 
consensus on crucial points for the expansion of the sector. This fact negatively affects 
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governance and financing mechanisms. State companies, through coordination and 
adaptation mechanisms, seek to maintain the institutional structure created by Planasa1. 
The preferences of state companies have been preserved and the current system has not 
been able to meet the country's real needs. 
The experience in other countries of the privatization of the water and sanitation 
sector, aiming at greater investment in the sector, brings at least paradoxical results. 
According to Armitage (2012), Bertomeu-Sanchez (2019), Allen and Pryke (2013), and 
Yearwood (2018), while increasing access to water and sanitation, these companies 
ended up leveraging themselves excessively as a way of pay higher dividends. 
Consequently, the higher interest payment ended up increasing water tariffs, in a model 
that benefits investors much more than consumers. 
In Brazil, there are still few publicly traded companies in this sector. However, with 
the recent approval of the Sanitation Regulatory Framework (LAW No. 14,026, of JULY 
15, 2020), the possibility opens up for new players with investment capacity superior to 
that of the public sector. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the dividend policy of publicly traded 
companies in relation to the price of their market value. This article is divided as follows: 
this introduction, followed by the theoretical framework where a bibliographic review is 
demonstrated which will support the working hypotheses. Then, the methodology details 
how the data was collected and analyzed. In the results section, the data analysis is shown 
according to the hypotheses and the results are discussed in the light of the literature. The 
article ends with the final considerations, where the conclusions are taken up. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1 National Sanitation Plan: instituted in 1971, determined the centrality of state sanitation companies in the 
provision of sanitation services in Brazil. Managed by the respective state executives, they would act for 
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The occurrence of privatizations of regulated sectors in countries like the United 
Kingdom such as railways and airports were carried out in the face of a scenario of 
deregulation, increased competition and customer choice, aiming to give the population a 
share in society (KAY; THOMPSON, 1986). According to Allen and Pryke (2013), since 
the privatization of water in England and Wales in 1989, with the hegemony of global 
infrastructure funds acquiring these companies, a distorted model of financialized 
infrastructure in the water sector has emerged. The authors argue that a debt refinancing 
model based primarily on securitizing corporate revenue streams has generated more 
benefits for investors than for customers. 
Allen and Pryke (2013) took the example of Thames Water, the UK's largest water 
company, with 13 million customers in southeastern England, of which just under 9 million 
depend on them for water supply. Purchased in 2006 by an international investor 
consortium led by Australian bank Macquarie Group, the authors demonstrated that the 
emergence of a financialized infrastructure model in the water sector has generated more 
benefits for investors than for customers. In addition, a debt refinancing model based 
largely on securitizing revenue streams has worked to the advantage of shareholders and 
financial intermediaries, showing that considerable dividend payments over time are 
largely financed, not outside cash flows, but through leveraged debt, and that this debt 
agreement is only possible due to the predictable nature of the revenue streams captured 
from families who have no choice about their water supplier or the amount they have to 
pay for their water. 
Still according to Allen and Pryke (2013), the adjustment to this reality by the 
regulator, however, seems to have occurred at a distance, with much of the financial 
calculation and political manipulation, causing losses to consumers, who, instead of 
benefiting from the new financial reality, were transformed into the financial asset of this 
industry. 
Similarly, Bertomeu-Sanchez (2019) studied the causal impact of the 
financialization of private companies on their results, focusing on the water and sewage 
sector in England and Wales, demonstrating that there is strong leverage in these 
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companies, and that this greater leverage and, therefore, financialization, contributed to a 
positive impact on tariffs with consumers. These results, according to Bertomeu-Sanchez 
(2019), suggest that financialization should be followed more carefully by regulators as 
evidence of negative effects - from a social welfare perspective - on the main outcome 
variables is presented. In fact, purchased water companies that provide essential goods 
and services are more leveraged, increasing the risk of financial difficulties and charging 
consumers higher prices. 
Yearwood (2018), in assessing the privatized water and sewage industry in the UK, 
demonstrated that the 40% increase in real household accounts since privatization was 
driven mainly by the continued increase in interest payments on debt, contrary to the 
argument of the which regulator attributed them to the rising costs and investments. In 
addition, the author showed that accelerating debt levels are mainly the result of 
disproportionate dividend payments, which have exceeded the cash balances of 
privatized companies in all but one year since 1989. The author concludes that the way 
the sector it is not sustainable and harms consumers, in addition to creating an 
environment of unreliable information on the part of the regulator and companies. 
According to Bertoméu-Sánchez and Estache (2019), there is little precise 
guidance in the academic literature on the interactions between infrastructure regulation 
and dividend payment decisions in the sector. Until recently, most insights were largely 
extrapolated from extensive comparisons between regulated and unregulated companies. 
Only recently has academic research advocated evaluations that explicitly focus on the 
behavior of regulated sectors in relation to their dividend payment decisions. Considering 
the case for closer monitoring of dividends in regulated industries is particularly important 
in a context where there is evidence that higher dividends are correlated with lower 
investments and possibly lower quality of service in various dimensions, a fact also seen 
by Silva (2019 ) in another regulated sector, the Brazilian electricity sector. In view of the 
current significant investment needs of regulated industries linked to environmental and 
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According to Armitage (2012), high levels of investment in relation to cash flows, 
combined with high dividend payments, have caused UK water companies to persistently 
resort to loans to meet their cash outflows. This behavior, according to the author, is not 
adequately explained by conventional theories of dividends. The intensive regulatory 
environment means that agency costs and information asymmetry are low, and there is 
no clear fiscal reason for companies' regular dividends. Armitage (2012) argues that large 
regular dividends are mainly explained by a demand for dividends from investors and that 
there are institutional or behavioral reasons for the demand. 
Another possible difference is that water companies are more transparent than 
regular companies and, therefore, the "information cost" of external capital is lower. The 
argument here is that, if a normal company gets into gear, it may need to increase equity, 
which would have transaction costs and information more severe than the increase in 
debt. The clearest differences are the lack of investment opportunities in the regulated 
water sector, in addition to the investment allowed by the regulator, and the very low level 
of risk in the business. When deciding on a company's leverage level, company managers 
say that retaining financial flexibility is of the first order (GRAHAM; HARVEY, 2001); in the 
UK survey by Beattie et al. (2006), "ensuring long-term survival" tops the list. Maintaining 
flexibility is valuable when future opportunities are uncertain and when a downturn in 
business may arise. Therefore, financial flexibility can be much more valuable to many 
unregulated companies than to water companies. It is worth exploring further how the 
value of flexibility affects gearing policy. 
When analyzing state companies in the water and sanitation sector between 2013 
and 2015, Araújo and Bertussi (2018) showed that the highest revenues are presented by 
the companies Sabesp, Cedae, Copasa and Sanepar. Among the costs, Sabesp, Copasa, 
Embasa and Cedae lead. Cosama, Caer, Caerd and Casal have the lowest costs and 
also the lowest revenues. Most companies have positive gross profit. However, Cosama 
and Caerd have been presenting gross losses for the past three years. As for the net 
result, almost half of the companies had a loss in 2015. The biggest net losses were 
presented by Saneago (R$ 235.3 million) and by Cagece (R$ 129 million). Sabesp (R $ 
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536.3 million) and Sanepar (R$ 438.4 million) had the highest net profits. However, 
Sabesp has been decreasing its net profits in recent years. From 2013 to 2015, its net 
profit fell by more than 70%. Sanepar, however, is the only company that has shown an 
increase (even if not so relevant) in net profit in all three years. Many companies increased 
their profits from 2013 to 2014, but declined in 2015. Of the twenty companies, fifteen of 
them had lower net profits in 2015 than in 2013, or had greater losses in that period. Five 
companies (Caer, Cagepa, Casal, Cosama and Caerd) had net losses in all three years. 
The results presented by Araújo and Bertussi (2018) demonstrate that state 
sanitation companies have low IRTs and a long payback period. Among the companies 
that presented positive rates of return in 2015, Sanesul (6.93%) and Sanepar (5.32%) 
were the ones that presented the highest rates. However, these rates are low, so much 
so that Sanesul will need 14 years (payback) to recover the investment made and Sanepar 
19 years. High capital companies, such as Sabesp and Cedae, will need 63 and 53 years, 
respectively. Deso, which made a paltry profit in 2015, would need 3,163 years. 
Magnusson and Enebrand (2018) investigated how the relationship between the 
company's performance and the share price is affected by the level of dividends a 
company pays. The authors performed a correlation and regression analysis performed 
on data collected from medium and large cap companies listed on the Stockholm stock 
exchange between the years 2007-2017. Their results indicated that most companies, 
which have the highest share prices, are in the high dividend yield sample. In addition to 
the average share price, it was also observed that the stock price standard deviation is 
smaller in the high dividend yield sample compared to the low dividend sample, featuring 
less variability and, therefore, less volatility. 
The results of the study by Magnusson and Enebrand (2018) show that the stock 
price of high dividend yield companies is more dependent on financial performance 
compared to low dividend yield companies, although there is a positive correlation in both 
groups. The authors suggest that this could be explained by investors' preference for how 
and when to receive their returns. On the investor's part, companies with high dividend 
payments generate short-term gains, while companies with low dividends are more 
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uncertain long-term gains. This behavior of risk aversion on the part of investors, in turn, 
causes them to place a premium on the return today, dividend, on the appreciation of the 
share price tomorrow. By applying this argument to the results of Magnusson and 
Enebrand (2018), the authors came to the conclusion that those who invest in companies 
that pay high dividends avoid uncertainty when receiving part of their return in dividends, 
investing based on the company's current performance and less on future potential 
earnings. Thus, there is a stronger correlation between the company's performance and 
the stock price. 
According to Raza et al. (2018), the empirical literature recorded systematic 
deviations in the behavior of dividend policy in different companies, countries and time 
intervals. Despite more than fifty years of debate and attempts to empirically prove the 
various theories, the evidence collected is neither conclusive nor does it fully clarify the 
effect of the dividend policy on the share price (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Relationship between dividends and stock prices (studies found) * 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
Positive relationship 10 14 
negative relationship  2 
ambivalent relationship 2 4 
No relation 3 3 
 *According Raza et al. (2018) 
 
In view of the above, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: companies that pay dividends in the water sector show greater 
appreciation of their shares. 
Hypothesis 2: companies that pay large dividends in the water sector show greater 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Publicly traded companies in the water and sanitation sector listed on B3 were 
selected from Yahoo Finance. The period ranged from the IPO of the shares until 
December 31, 2019. The following variables were collected from each company: prices 
by share, payment of dividends (aggregated in annual payment), annual net income and 
payout, defined as the ratio between the dividend payment and net income. The 
companies were divided into two groups: paying and non-paying dividends. Student's t-
test established with a level of statistical significance set at 0.1 was used to compare the 
following parameters: annual change in stock price (both in relation to the previous year 
and two years earlier) and annual change in net profit (both in terms of compared to the 
previous year as well as two years earlier). 
From the group of dividend-paying shares, it was divided into two other groups: 
low-payout and high-payout shares. The cut-off point was 30%, given the mandatory 
payment of minimum dividends established at 25% of net income (Law 6,404 / 76). 
Student's t-test established with a level of statistical significance set at 0.1 was used to 
compare the following parameters: annual change in stock price (both in relation to the 
previous year and two years earlier) and annual change in net profit (both in terms of in 
relation to the previous year and two years earlier), in addition to the annual variation in 





Four publicly traded companies listed on B3 were found: Sanepar (code sapr3), 
Copasa (csmg3), Sabesp (sbsp3) and Casan (casn4). There were 48 companies-years 
since 2001 (Sabesp's case), 2007 (Copasa), 2011 (Sanepar) and 2013 (Casan). Only 
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Table 2 shows the comparison between paying and non-paying dividend 
companies. None of the parameters studied was statistically significant, despite the fact 
that the group of dividend payers all had outcomes that were numerically superior to the 
other group. These results, therefore, demonstrate the nullity of hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 2 – Comparison between dividend paying and non-paying companies 
 payers (mean ± standard 
error) 
No payers (mean ± standard 
error) 
P value 
payout 66,4±11,3   
∆cot 13,8±5,3 4,2±6,6 0,57 
∆div 47±23,6   
∆LL 4,3±48 -23,8±139,8 0,89 
∆pay 82,8±32,6   
pay-1 20±27,7   
∆cot-1 8,5±7,9 5±7,8 0,87 
∆div-1 20,1±19,7   
∆LL-1 100±66 59,1±183,5 0,89 
∆pay-1 -39,3±57,8   
 
Abbreviations: ∆cot: variation of the share price between t0 and t-1; ∆div: variation 
in the dividend paid per share between t0 and t-1; ∆LL: variation in net earnings per share 
between t0 and t-1; ∆pay: payout variation between t0 and t-1; pay-1: payout in the period t-
1; ∆cot-1: variation of the share price between t-1 and t-2; ∆div-1: variation in the dividend 
paid per share between t-1 and t-2; ∆LL-1: variation in net earnings per share between t-1 
and t-2; ∆pay-1: payout variation between t-1 and t-2. 
Table 3 shows the comparison between high and low payout companies. The only 
statistically significant parameter was the average payout itself. Of the other parameters, 
we highlight the high dispersion of dividend payments in the low payout group (standard 
error of 107.9) compared to the previous year, the high dispersion of the payout variation 
in the low payout group (standard error of 93) in relation to the previous year, the highest 
price by share growth in the low payout group in the two periods tested. These results, 
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It is also important to highlight, within high-payout companies (table 3), the variation 
in payout in relation to the previous year (t-1) between year t-1 and year t-2. The first 
variation was highly positive (94%), quite different from the last (represented in Table 3 
as ∆pay-1), which had a negative variation (-48%) Student's t-test demonstrated statistical 
significance (p = 0.08 ). When tested in the low payout group, there was no difference 
between the periods. This finding is in agreement with the study by Armitage (2012), which 
demonstrated that the payout of companies in the water sector can vary according to the 
perception of managers in relation to shareholders' greed for dividends. Armitage (2012), 
in turn, places his findings within the theory of catering dividends, by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004). Paradoxically, still in table 3, it is possible to see that the variation in payout in 
both years was negatively related to net income, perhaps in an attempt to keep the amount 
of dividends paid constant. 
 
Table 3 – Comparison between high and low payout companies 
 Payout < 30 (mean ± 
standard error) 
Payout > 30 (mean ± 
standard error) 
P value 
payout 11,1±1,6 90,2±13,1 9x10-8 
∆cot 21,2±8,3 14,3±6,5 0,53 
∆div 158,2±107,9 67±34,2 0,39 
∆LL 64,2±73,8 -35,7±24 0,23 
∆pay 47,3±50 94,1±40,6 0,47 
pay-1 106,3±93 20,9±42,3 0,62 
∆cot-1 12,7±5,4 7,2±10,5 0,65 
∆div-1 46,7±32,3 24,6±36,2 0,36 
∆LL-1 -20±80,1 77,8±53,8 0,38 
∆pay-1 42,6±70,1 -48,4±72,9 0,43 
* statistical significance 
 
Abbreviations: ∆cot: variation of the share price between t0 and t-1; ∆div: variation 
in the dividend paid per share between t0 and t-1; ∆LL: variation in net earnings per share 
between t0 and t-1; ∆pay: payout variation between t0 and t-1; pay-1: payout in the period t-
1; ∆cot-1: variation of the share price between t-1 and t-2; ∆div-1: variation in the dividend 
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paid per share between t-1 and t-2; ∆LL-1: variation in net earnings per share between t-1 





Due to historical deficiencies within the water and sanitation sector, the need for 
greater investment has led to new paradigms within a sector until then statist and 
dependent on the public sector. The entry of private investors, in addition to a greater 
inflow of resources to improve infrastructure, also means a change in the management 
model. As seen in the case of the United Kingdom, the trade-off between investors and 
consumers has led to conflicts whose regulation implies legal certainty and a regulatory 
agency capable of managing this conflict. 
The new Sanitation Regulatory Framework, approved in 2020, should avoid the 
imbalance between the remuneration of investors, the investment necessary for the 
qualified universalization of the service, the leverage of companies and the tariff for the 
consumer, which must be compatible with the economic reality of families. This study 
focused on publicly traded companies in the water and sanitation sector. These 
companies, which have been operating for years within a legal framework that is in the 
process of being overcome, are trying to balance the social responsibility of an essential 
good (water) and the remuneration of investors within a heterogeneous market for 
financial assets. The intra-sectoral analysis also served to search for possible differences 
between companies and between different periods. Unfortunately, the small sample size 
prevented a more robust statistical analysis. However, an important variation of payout in 
different periods in the group of companies with high payout was found, which is 
compatible with the study that Armitage (2012) carried out in the water and sanitation 
sector in the United Kingdom. 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, the following conclusions were reached: 1) 
no statistically significant differences were found between dividend paying and non-paying 
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companies in terms of the value of their shares; 2) no statistically significant differences 
were found between high and low payout paying companies in terms of the value of their 
shares. 
The future prospects will be to consider the dividend policy of Brazilian companies 
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addition to an increase in covered time, a greater number of companies and the use of 
other variables (financial or not) for a better understanding of the sector's dividend policy 
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